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Abstract 
 
This study examines the relationship between firm corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
CEO confidence. Research shows that CSR has a hedging feature. Research also shows that 
more confident CEOs underestimate firm risks, which, in turn, leads them to undertake relatively 
less hedging. Consistent with this, we find that CEO confidence is negatively related to the level 
of CSR. Closer analysis shows that this effect is stronger in the institutional aspects of CSR, such 
as community and workforce diversity, rather than in the technical aspects of CSR, such as 
corporate governance and product quality.  Our results are robust to different competing 
explanations, including narcissism, which refers in this context to CEOs who engage in CSR to 
attract attention and alternative proxies for CSR and CEO confidence.  
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1. Introduction  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined by McWilliams and Siegel (2001, p117) as 
involving “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and 
that which is required by law”. The range of CSR activities is broad. For instance, firms may 
develop products that are made of environmentally-friendly materials, work closely with 
community organizations, or donate to charities. This means that CSR activity can affect the firm 
and the broader society. With regard to CSR and the firm, the research is somewhat 
contradictory. Early research (Friedman, 1970) argued that CSR is negative for shareholders, 
while more recently, others (Jiao, 2010; Edmans, 2011; Deng, 2013; Cheng, 2014; Flammer, 
2015) found that it is positive for shareholder value. One way in which CSR is positive for 
shareholders is as a hedging device (Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria, 2004; Heal, 2005; Lee and 
Faff, 2009; Goss and Roberts, 2011 and Humphrey et al., 2012). 
Recent research also shows that some personal traits of managers impact upon corporate 
policies, including hedging (Ben-David et al., 2013 and Deshmukh et al., 2013). This study 
focusses on the personal trait of confidence. Furthermore, overconfident managers systematically 
overestimate the probability of good outcomes and, correspondingly, underestimate the 
probability of bad outcomes resulting from their actions (Heaton, 2002). In particular, for the 
focus of this paper, managerial overconfidence has been shown to cause managers to undertake 
less hedging than optimal for stockholder value maximization (Malmendier et al., 2011 and Ben-
David et al., 2013).
1
 Consistent with these links between CSR and hedging and CEO confidence 
and hedging, this paper examines the relationship between CSR and CEO confidence. 
                                                          
1
 Depending on the analysis undertaken, research may refer to overconfidence or level of confidence. The former uses a 
dichotomous variable and the latter a continuous variable. The current study considers both and will use the description most 
appropriate throughout the paper. 
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In this paper, we document a significant negative relationship between CEO confidence 
and CSR activity. Specifically, the more confident the CEO, the less CSR activity undertaken by 
the firm. This relationship holds true after controlling for CEO characteristics of gender, age, and 
tenure and an array of firm, industry, and time variables. We also specifically test and reject an 
alternative hypothesis of narcissism (that is, those CEOs who seek attention, in this context by 
engaging in CSR), which proposes a positive relation between CEO confidence and CSR. More 
detailed analysis of different dimensions of CSR shows that the negative relationship between 
CEO confidence and CSR is found for institutional aspects of CSR, such as community and 
workforce diversity, but not for technical CSR, such as corporate governance and product 
quality.   However, this result is weakened somewhat when we drill down into the individual 
aspects of CSR, and find that increasing levels of confidence is generally negatively related to 
positive aspects of CSR, but not related to negative aspects of CSR. In other words, more 
confident CEOs do less “positive” CSR, but do not do more or less “negative” CSR, relative to 
less confident CEOs.  Although we find that female CEOs, on average, score higher on CSR than 
male CEOs, their average confidence score is significantly lower than that of male CEOs. 
However, the gender of the CEO is not significant in explaining CSR in a multivariate setting. 
As well, the age of the CEO is negatively related to CSR, while tenure of the CEO is positively 
related to CSR, albeit at only the 10% level. All results are consistent after applying a barrage of 
robustness checks.     
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature and hypothesis 
development; Section 3 discusses the sample, variable selection, and descriptive analysis; 
Section 4 documents the research, design, and results; while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
4 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The key relationships in this study that we develop into the testable hypotheses are those 
between CSR and hedging, confidence and hedging, and confidence and CSR.  That is, hedging 
is of value to the firm, and CSR is a form of hedging.  As overconfident CEOs hedge less, we 
hypothesise that firms with overconfident CEOs will engage is less CSR. The literature to 
develop this argument is considered below. 
2.1 CSR and hedging 
Over recent years, the views by academics and practitioners on CSR have changed. Before the 
1980s, CSR was treated as a burden on the firm, which benefitted various stakeholders but at the 
expense of stockholders (Friedman, 1970). From the 1980s, CSR grew in importance in firm 
strategy, which coincided with development of stakeholder theory of the firm (Freeman, 1984). 
According to Godfrey et al. (2009), CSR is now used to signal to various stakeholders 
that the company is partially altruistic (other-considering) and not completely agonistic (self-
considering).  Generally, the managers of firms adopting CSR appear to consider the impact of 
their decisions upon social good and broad stakeholder interest in the expectation that this will 
flow back as “positive attribution or moral capital” (Godfrey et al., 2009, p428).  In this sense, 
CSR is part of a firm’s risk management strategy; it can therefore be regarded as a hedging tool.   
 The broad area of firm risk management research is well developed, and a large amount 
of the research focusses on hedging. A number of strands exist in the literature.  Firstly, there are 
those that look to develop a theory of hedging, such as Smith and Stulz (1985) who provide a 
theoretical framework for hedging as part of a firm’s overall financing policy, and Stulz (1996, 
p23–24) who argues that “the primary goal of risk management is to eliminate the probability of 
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costly lower-tail outcomes–those that would cause financial distress or make a company unable 
to carry out its investment strategy”.  Secondly, there is a large body of empirical work that 
investigates the determinants of firms that hedge, using survey data, including Nance et al., 1993 
and Tufano 1996.  
More recent empirical work focusses on the impact of hedging on firm value. For 
example, Allayannis and Weston (2001), Carter et al. (2006), Adam and Fernando (2006), 
Bartram et al. (2011), Campello et al. (2011) and Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013) all report that 
hedging increases firm value.  In contrast, Jin and Jorion (2006) found no relation between 
hedging and firm value in oil and gas firms. 
In terms of CSR as a hedge, CSR is clearly not as explicit as using a derivative contract.  
It is more subtle, and is about creating goodwill. For example, if a firm experiences an event that 
has a negative impact on its operations such as the impact on customers affected by changed 
trading hours or employees by changed work conditions, CSR mitigates the negative impact of 
the event. It does this by creating moral capital. Such moral capital helps stockholders attribute 
the negative event to what Godfrey et al. (2009, p428) call “managerial maladroitness rather than 
malevolence”, which accordingly, reduces the punishment to firms facing these negative events. 
Thus, CSR is a way of hedging some of the risks facing the firm (Peloza, 2006; Godfrey et al., 
2009 and Minor and Morgan, 2011). Empirical evidence confirms this hedging feature of CSR. 
Godfrey et al. (2009) find that when firms are facing negative law suits in the US, those with 
higher CSR suffer less firm value reduction than those with lower CSR. Additional evidence 
supporting CSR’s hedging effects is provided by Minor and Morgan (2011), who find that firms 
with higher levels of CSR investment suffer relatively less firm value reduction in cases where a 
product recall is required due to a product defect. In addition, Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria 
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(2004), Lee and Faff (2009), and Humphrey et al. (2012) find evidence that CSR is positively 
related to lower firm idiosyncratic risk.  
 
2.2 Confidence and hedging 
The link between CEO confidence and hedging stems from the assertion that overconfident 
CEOs overestimate their ability to obtain precise information about cash flows generated from 
prospective projects. In other words, they overestimate their own accuracy. This leads 
overconfident CEOs to underestimate the variation in cash flows generated from these projects. 
Overconfident CEOs understate the risks of projects (Ben-David et al., 2013 and Deshmukh et 
al., 2013), and because overconfident CEOs perceive their firms to be relatively less risky, they 
are less likely to hedge their firm’s operations. This is borne out in the empirical literature. 
Marshall et al. (2012), for example, find overconfident managers in the UK are less likely to 
hedge foreign exchange exposure, and Adam et al. (2012), using a sample of North American 
gold mining firms, document that overconfident CEOs undertake less hedging (are more risky).
2
  
Although a range of methods has been used to measure overconfidence (Hill et al., 2014), 
the most common were developed using managerial stock options (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a 
and 2005b). Malmendier and Tate (2005a and 2005b) proxy for a CEO’s overconfidence in two 
ways using a dichotomous classification. The first is based on beliefs revealed from managerial 
                                                          
2 The relationship between overconfidence and firm value is more complex than between overconfidence and hedging. There is 
evidence that overconfident CEOs tend to over-invest and waste money on negative NPV projects (Gervais et al., 2011; 
Campbell et al., 2011 and Kim, 2013). However, the level of overconfidence seems important. For example, Goel and Thakor 
(2008) show that moderate levels of CEO overconfidence benefit the firm while extreme levels are detrimental. Generally, it is 
not clear if overconfident CEOs have a positive or negative effect on firm value (Banerjee et al., 2015a). 
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stock option exercise behaviour, while the second is based on outsiders’ perception, obtained 
from analyses of media and how the CEO is portrayed.  Malmendier and Tate then use these 
overconfidence measurements to empirically examine how CEO overconfidence affects a firm’s 
investment decisions. They find that the investments and cash sensitivity are stronger among 
firms with overconfident CEOs, especially equity-dependent firms. The results are consistent 
with both proxies for overconfidence.  
In this paper, we follow Malmendier and Tate’s (2005a and 2005b) method of using 
managerial stock option exercise behaviour to determine confidence levels. However, rather than 
having a dichotomous variable for overconfidence/not overconfidence, we initially follow 
Banerjee et al. (2015a and 2015b), amongst others, and use a continuous variable. This is 
explained in detail in Section 3.
3
  
 
2.3 CSR and Confidence 
Overconfidence has been linked to a range of corporate decisions leading to investment 
distortions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a). However, very little research has considered the 
impact that CEO confidence has on the level of CSR undertaken by the firm. This is the key 
contribution of the current study. Based on the literature discussed above, we are investigating 
the following: As hedging is useful and CSR is a hedge, and overconfident managers hedge less, 
then, consistent with this, overconfident CEOs will do less CSR. A possible alternative argument 
is based upon a personality trait that is related to overconfidence, namely narcissism. Although 
narcissistic personality disorder is defined by the American Psychiatric Association (2013) as a 
                                                          
3 We test for robustness of this proxy which we discuss in Section 5.1. 
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diagnosable condition, some of the features of narcissism have been linked to people who are 
overconfident. For example, Schaefer et al. (2004) document a relationship between 
overconfidence and narcissistic personality traits.  Generally, people with narcissistic traits have 
a strong need for admiration; CSR provides opportunities for CEOs to obtain admiration.   
Petrenko et al. (2015) provide three reasons to link CSR with narcissistic CEOs. Firstly, CSR are 
value-loaded initiatives that appear to further some social good. Secondly, CSR engages sets of 
value sensitive audiences in adulation, media attention, and praise (Wallace and Baumeister, 
2002). Finally, CSR offers a variety of avenues to change the status quo, supplying continuity 
and variety to the opportunities that narcissistic CEOs have to exhibit themselves to attentive and 
responsive audiences.  In a sample of Fortune 500 firms over 10 years, Petrenko et al. (2015) 
find strong support for a positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR.  Given that 
there is a positive relationship between both confidence and narcissism and narcissism and CSR, 
we expect there would be a positive association between CSR and CEO confidence, especially in 
those aspects of CSR that relate to providing admiration to the CEO. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis Development  
Given the considerable amount of research that indicates CSR is value creating for firms, the 
expected relationship of CSR with CEO confidence is less clear.  If the hedging effect of CSR 
dominates, then the more confident a CEO, the more likely that person will be to underestimate 
the risks to their firm, and, as a result, undertake less hedging relative to firms with less confident 
CEOs. Given that CSR is a form of hedging, we expect more confident CEOs to undertake less 
CSR. However, if narcissism dominates, we expect more confident CEOs to undertake more 
CSR.  
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Owing to the multidimensionality of CSR, the hedging effects of different dimensions of 
CSR may vary. Similarly, different aspects of CSR provide different impacts for narcissism. In 
relation to the hedging impact, there are both technical and institutional dimensions to CSR. 
Technical CSR consists of initiatives regarding corporate governance, employee relations, and 
product quality. Institutional CSR, on the other hand, is comprised of initiatives regarding 
community, workforce diversity, environment, and human rights. Godfrey et al. (2009) find that 
institutional CSR has a stronger hedging effect, while technical CSR has a weaker hedging 
effect.  
In relation to CEO narcissism, we expect CEO confidence to have a positive impact on 
the institutional aspects of CSR relative to the technical aspects of CSR. The institutional aspects 
of CSR include charitable giving.  However, as charitable giving is one of the more notable traits 
of narcissistic CEOs (Petrenko et al., 2015), we expect that there would be a positive relation 
between CEO confidence and institutional aspects of CSR. In relation to technical aspects of 
CSR, it is not clear what relationship we expect from increased narcissism linked to CEO 
confidence.    
 
3 Sample and Variable Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
The data are derived from several databases. Compustat provides the firm year-end stock prices 
and financial information. Following El Ghoul et al. (2011), we use the comprehensive ratings 
provided by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) Stats database on firm CSR to construct the 
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CSR proxies. These data are available via WRDS. Owing to the data coverage of databases, our 
main sample period covers 1992 to 2012.
4
  
KLD divides various CSR-related items into seven categories: the community, corporate 
governance, workforce diversity, employee relations, the environment, human rights, and 
product quality. For each individual category, KLD assigns a binary (0/1) ratings to a set of 
strengths and concerns. Each strength or concern is assigned 1 if it meets the criteria. KLD sum 
these for strengths and concerns in each category. We calculate a score for each category of CSR 
by subtracting the number of concerns from the number of strengths within that area. Then we 
aggregate individual scores to form an overall CSR score (CSR). This approach follows previous 
literature, including Jiao (2010), El Ghoul et al. (2011), and Jo and Harjoto (2012).  
Initially, following Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2012), and 
Banerjee et al. (2015a and 2015b), we measure confidence based on CEO beliefs revealed by 
CEO option exercise behaviour. Hall and urphy (2002) find that, given the non-tradable 
feature of executive options and the high level of executive under-diversification, a rational 
executive should exercise deep in-the-money options early. This early exercise behaviour is 
supported by empirical findings (Huddart and Lang, 1996 and Ofek and Yermack, 2000). 
Overconfident CEOs are reluctant to exercise deep in-the-money executive stock options early 
because they overestimate their firms’ future performance and undervalue current stock prices 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005a). Therefore, a proxy for CEO overconfidence is the lack of 
executive option exercise behaviour for deep in-the-money options. Malmendier and Tate (2005a 
and 2005b, amongst many others) assume that managers are overconfident when they fail to 
                                                          
4 Execucomp is used to obtain the executive option holdings and personal information; IRRC is used to obtain firm anti-takeover 
provisions; Thomson Reuters 13-F filings s34 Master File provides institutional investor holdings data. Reasons for this data are 
explained later. Execucomp has been in place since 1992, and the latest social ratings at time of writing is 2012. 
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exercise options that are more than 67 percent in-the-money. Although Hirshleifer et al. (2012) 
follow Malmendier and Tate (2005a), they use average strike price because of data limitations. 
We take a slightly different approach initially and follow Banerjee et al. (2015a and 2015b), and 
then follow up with robustness tests using the method proposed by Hirshleifer et al. (2012). We 
discuss differences between Banerjee et al. (2015a and 2015b) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) in the 
robustness section.  
To construct our CEO confidence variable, we merged the detailed data on CEO option 
holdings from Execucomp with the year-end firm stock price from Compustat for each firm. 
Then, from Compustat, we combined the CEO confidence dataset with firm-level and industry-
level control variables for each firm. From Execucomp, we obtained both the number of 
unexercised but vested options and the value of those options. We then constructed the value-
per-option by dividing the value of a CEO’s unexercised-but-vested option holdings by the 
number of such options. Finally, we constructed our CONFIDENCE variable by dividing the 
value-per-option by the year-end stock price obtained from Compustat.  
Following prior literature, we use several proxies to control for CEO and firm characteristics   
that can potentially influence a firm’s decision to engage in CSR. The control variables include: 
 CEO characteristics: Some characteristics of the CEO are commonly included in studies 
of CSR, generally as controls in regression models. We control for CEO Gender: the 
gender of the CEO has been shown to impact the level of CSR in a firm. Manner (2010), 
Marquis and Lee (2013) and Zhang et al. (2013) find that having a female CEO positively 
relates to the level of CSR. We use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is male, and 
zero otherwise. We expect a negative relationship between gender and CSR. CEO Age: 
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The age of the CEO has been shown to impact the level of CSR in a firm. Fabrizi et al. 
(2014) find a positive relationship between the age of the CEO and CSR, although some 
other studies have not found any relationship, including Godos-Diez et al. (2011). 
Therefore, we are not sure what relationship to expect between CEO age and CSR. CEO 
Tenure: defined as the number of years the CEO has been in the position. This has been 
included in studies on CSR, for example Chin et al. (2013). The results have been 
inconsistent, so we are unsure of the relationship between CEO tenure and CSR. 
 Firm profitability: Proxied by the return on assets calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by the book value of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
We expect a positive relationship between firm profitability and CSR (Waddock and 
Graves 1997 and Campbell, 2007). 
 Firm size: Proxied by the natural log of the book value of total assets at the beginning of 
the year. We expect a positive relationship between firm size and CSR (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001).  
 Firm leverage: Proxied by long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets at the 
beginning of the year. We expect a negative relationship between firm leverage and CSR 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997 and Jiao, 2010). 
 Firm differentiation: Proxied by advertising expense scaled by book value of total assets 
at the beginning of the year. We expect a positive relationship between firm 
differentiation and CSR (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000 and Jo and Harjoto, 2012). 
 Firm innovation: Proxied by R&D expenditure scaled by book value of total assets at 
beginning of the year. We expect a positive relationship between firm innovation and 
CSR (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000 and Jo and Harjoto, 2012). 
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 Firm capital expenditure (reliance on reputation): Proxied by total capital expenditure 
scaled by book value of total assets at beginning of the year. We expect a positive 
relationship between capital expenditure and CSR (Jo and Harjoto, 2012). 
 Firm managerial entrenchment: Proxied by the E-index developed by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009). We expect a negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and CSR 
(Barnea and Rubin, 2010). 
 Outside monitoring: Proxied by the sum of all ownership positions greater than five 
percent held by institutional investors. The relationship between outside monitoring and 
CSR is uncertain (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007 and Barnea and Rubin, 2010).  
Table 1 provides details of all the main variables we use.  Variables that have not been 
mentioned previously in Table 1 are discussed later in the paper.  
[Table 1 here] 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The final sample includes 15,379 firm-year observations, and represents 2,138 firms with 3,478 
different CEOs. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the sample.
5
 
[Table 2 here] 
Table 2, Panel A presents summary statistics for firm-level characteristics for the sample. The 
average total assets are approximately US$20b (which corresponds to approximately US$10b in 
market capitalization of equity — not reported). Statistics for control variables are similar to 
those reported by Jo and Harjoto (2012). Panel B summarizes CEO characteristics. The 
                                                          
5 All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. 
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independent variable CONFIDENCE shows that, on average, a CEO’s confidence level is 0.289, 
a figure similar to that reported by Banerjee et al. (2015a). The average level of CSR is -0.072, 
showing that, overall, firms are slightly negative on the KLD measure of CSR during the sample 
period. CEOs in the sample, on average, have tenure of 7.754 years and an age of 55.984 years.6 
There are 3 percent female CEOs, which indicates that the majority of CEOs in the sample are 
male. A recent report indicated that 4.6 percent of Fortune 1000 CEOs were female (see 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-ceos-fortune-1000). Generally, female CEOs in the 
sample had significantly lower confidence scores, significantly greater CSR scores, significantly 
less tenure, and were significantly younger than male CEOs. These differences are explored in 
more detail later. 
3.2 Correlation Matrix 
To test the presence of multicollinearity, we conduct a pairwise correlation test between all 
variables that we use. Table 3 summarizes these results.  
[Table 3 here] 
Firstly, the majority of correlations are well below 0.5. Table 3 also shows the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for the variables used in the main model. All values are well below 10, which 
indicates that multicollinearity is not a concern. It is worth noting that we find a negative 
correlation (significant) between CSR and CONFIDENCE, which indicates that firms with more 
confident CEOs tend to undertake less CSR. 
 
                                                          
6 The number of observations for age and tenure is lower than that for other variables due to missing data. 
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4 Results 
To assess the impact of our results on the existing literature, we first estimate a basic OLS 
regression with no fixed effects, excluding our confidence measure: 
                                                                       
                                                           
                                                                                                   ( ) 
The results are shown in table 4, and the variables are defined in Table 1.   
[Table 4 here] 
The predicted signs on the coefficients are shown in the second column of Table 4, and the results 
of estimating Model 1 using OLS regression are shown in the third column of Table 4.  As shown in 
the third column, the results are similar to those predicted from the existing literature in both sign 
and significance. The exceptions include capital expenditure (CAPITALEXP), which enters Model 
1 with a significantly negative coefficient and managerial entrenchment (EINDEX), which is 
positive and significant.  CEO gender (GENDER) and age (AGE) are both negative and significant, 
while CEO tenure (TENURE) is insignificant. Outside monitoring (BLOCKHOLDINGS) is 
negative and significant.  We then augment the CONFIDENCE variable into Model 1 as follows: 
                                                                             
                                                                       
                                                                                               (   ) 
The variables are as previously defined. 
In the fourth column of Table 4, we report the results of Model 1.1. The CONFIDENCE 
variable enters Model 1.1 with a significantly negative coefficient. This indicates that the level of 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
16 
 
CEO confidence is negatively related to the level of CSR. The other control variables remain similar 
to Model 1 without the CONFIDENCE variable. In the fifth column of Table 4, we report the 
results using panel regression with firm and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered on firm, 
excluding the CONFIDENCE variable.  As shown in the fifth column, the results are quite different 
from those in the third column. Many of the signs on the variables switch and/or lose their 
significance. This indicates that taking account of fixed effects and standard errors clustered on 
firms can have important implications for panel data analyses in explaining CSR. We then  re-
introduce the CONFIDENCE variable into our model with both year and firm fixed effects and 
standard errors clustered on firm. 
The results of re-estimating Model 1.1 are shown in the sixth column of Table 4. As shown, 
the model is highly significant, and has an adjusted R
2
 of approximately 12 percent. The 
CONFIDENCE variable enters the model with a significant negative coefficient. As the level of 
CEO confidence increases, it is correlated with a negative relationship with the level of CSR. 
This is after controlling for other variables previously found to relate to the level of CSR 
undertaken by firms. The control variables remain similar in sign and significance to results with 
the confidence variable excluded (fifth column). The gender dichotomous variable is 
insignificant. This means that there is no difference between CEO gender and the level of CSR. 
This is in contrast to the existing literature regarding female CEOs and CSR (Manner, 2010; 
Marquis and Lee, 2013 and Zhang et al., 2013). Although we find a significant univariate 
difference between male and female CEOs on confidence, CSR, tenure, and age (as shown in 
Table 2), this does not manifest in a multivariate setting in relation to CSR.  Although we find a 
negative (positive) relationship between CEO age (CEO tenure) and CSR on a multivariate basis, 
it is significant only at the 10 percent level.  
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In relation to other control variables, we find a significant positive relationship between 
profitability (ROA) and CSR, which supports Campbell’s (2007) institutional argument and the 
empirical evidence of Ruf et al. (2001). Because higher profitability provides resources to firms, 
they have a higher propensity to engage in CSR. Although our initial OLS results were consistent 
with the findings of Chih et al. (2010) that firm size (LNAT) positively correlates with CSR, we 
do not find support for this result controlling for year and firm fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered on firms.  A positive relationship between CSR and leverage (DEBT) is found. 
Advertising expense (ADEXP) and R&D expense (RDEXP) are not significant. We find that 
managerial entrenchment (EINDEX) is significantly negatively related to CSR. Blockholder 
ownership (BLOCKHOLDINGS) negatively impacts a firm’s CSR engagement, consistent with 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) and Woidtke (2002), but inconsistent with Jo and Harjoto (2012).  
The last column in Table 4 shows the economic importance of the coefficients. For a one 
standard deviation change in CONFIDENCE, the mean level of CSR changes by 1.361. This can 
be compared to the other significant coefficients. Generally, the impact of confidence on CSR is 
equally important as CEO age and tenure, as well as the debt level of the firm. This also implies 
that, if a CEO is overconfident by one standard deviation from that of the average firm CEO, the 
firm is going to generate a CSR score of -0.098 (-0.413 x 0.239).  Although converting this to 
any accurate dollar value is beyond the scope of the current paper, a recent study by Flammer 
(2015) provides some evidence of the value of CSR. Flammer has indicated that the adoption of 
a CSR initiative leads to an increase in stockholder value of 1.77%.  As a very rough calculation, 
if we assume that the adoption of one CSR initiative increases the KLD CSR score by 1, it 
correspondingly increases stockholder value by 1.77%. A change in confidence by one standard 
deviation will change the average CSR score by -0.098 (from -0.072 to -0.170), which equates to 
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a 0.173% decrease in value (1.77% x -0.098). Given that the average firm in our sample has a 
market value of equity of approximately $10billion, a 0.173% reduction in value equates to 
approximately $17 million. Therefore, a CEO who is overconfident by one standard deviation 
from the average will reduce CSR, resulting in a $17 million reduction in stockholder value. 
The positive relationship between CSR and CEO confidence, which is indicative of the 
impact of narcissism, is not evident. To further investigate these relationships with CSR, we 
separate CSR into institutional and technical components. As shown in our literature review, 
institutional components of CSR (COM, DIV, ENV and HUM) are expected to have a greater 
hedging impact than the technical aspects of CSR (CGOV, EMP and PRO). Similarly, 
institutional aspects of CSR are expected to have a greater impact for narcissism. We expect a 
positive relationship between institutional components of CSR if the narcissistic aspect of CEO 
confidence dominates, while we expect a negative relationship if the hedging effect dominates. 
Therefore, to test the second hypothesis, we estimate a similar model to Model 1.1, but replace 
the CSR variable with the summation of the individual scores for the institutional components 
(INST – Model 2) and similarly for the technical components (TECH –Model 3): 
                   
                                                            
                                                               
                                                                    (   ) 
The variables are as previously defined. 
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To explore further the relationship between CSR overconfidence and institutional CSR, we 
created a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in the highest quartile of institutional CSR, 
and zero otherwise (INSTHI)
7
:  
                                                          
                                                                  
                                                      
                                                                           ( ) 
The variables are as previously defined. The results of estimating Models 2, 3, and 4 are reported 
in Table 5.  
[Table 5 here] 
For Models 2, 3, and 4 there is an increase in the adjusted R
2
 over Model 1.1. All models are 
highly significant, as shown by the F-statistics. Also shown in Table 5, the coefficient on 
CONFIDENCE enters the regression for the institutional components of CSR with a negative 
and significant value (column 2), but is insignificant for the technical components of CSR 
(column 3). This further supports the link that CSR has with hedging and confidence. In relation 
to interaction effects (Model 4), we find a significant negative interaction between confidence 
and high levels of institutional CSR.  There is no evidence of the impact of narcissism. The 
control variables generally remain consistent (in sign and/or significance) across all models, 
although there is some variation.  
                                                          
7 We thank the referee for suggesting this approach. 
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To obtain an even greater understanding of the individual components of CSR and CEO 
confidence, Table 6 reports the results for models where the dependent variable is the individual 
components of CSR.   
[Table 6 here] 
The F-statistics for these models are all significant at the 1 percent level, which indicate that all 
these seven models are significant, with the adjusted R
2
 ranging from approximately 4.5 percent 
to 20 percent. A significant negative relationship is found for two of the four institutional 
components of CSR and for one of the three technical components of SR. Specifically, CEO 
confidence is negatively related to communities (COM) and the workforce diversity (DIV) 
components of CSR.  A negative coefficient occurs for the environment (ENV), but it enters the 
model insignificantly, while a positive but insignificant coefficient occurs for human resources 
(HUM). For the technical components of CSR, a significant negative coefficient occurs for 
employment (EMP). There is no significant relationship between the CEO confidence and 
corporate governance (CGOV), and we find a significant and positive relationship between 
product quality score (PRO) and CEO confidence level. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) theorize that 
overconfident CEOs are strong innovators and achieve greater innovative success for given 
research and development expenditures. This may explain the positive relationship between CEO 
confidence and product quality that we document.  We discuss this relationship in more detail 
later.  Overall, the results generally support the hedging aspects of the CSR-overconfidence 
relationship. In relation to the impact of narcissism, we expect a positive relationship with the 
community component of CSR. As the community component includes charity giving, it is here 
that narcissism effects would most likely occur (Petrenko et al., 2015). We find no evidence of 
this. 
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Although the KLD measure of CSR has been used extensively in research, an issue 
regarding the construct validity of the aggregation of the individual components has been raised 
(Mattingly and Berman 2006). The individual components of the KLD measure comprise a range 
of strengths and a range of concerns. To investigate the impact of the strengths and concerns we 
re-estimate Model 1.1 on the strengths and concerns, separately, for each individual qualitative 
KLD area of CSR. A summary of these results is shown in Table 7.  
[Table 7 here] 
The negative relationship is significant for strengths in Community, Diversity, and Human 
Rights (75 percent of institutional components), and significant for corporate governance and 
employee relations (67 percent of the technical components).  Furthermore, the results document 
that confidence is generally related only to reductions in the components of CSR that are 
regarded as strengths. In other words, more confident CEOs do not increase or decrease 
components of CSR that are regarded as concerns. More confident CEOs simply do less positive 
CSR relative to less confident CEOs, and this is more associated with institutional aspects of 
CSR than with technical aspects of CSR. This assertion supports the theoretical development of 
CSR’s insurance-like features, as documented by Godfrey (2005). There is no evidence that CSR 
is impacted by narcissism traits linked to confident CEOs. 
It should be stressed that the hedging hypothesis does not predict that CSR is going to be 
evident only in institutional components of CSR. Additionally, the division of CSR into 
institutional and technical components is not definitive. For example, Godfrey et al. (2009) 
include only Community and Diversity in their categorisation of institutional components of 
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CSR. If we include only these two components into our definition of institutional CSR, our 
results would be more supportive of the hedging hypothesis.  
Interestingly, there is no significant relationship between confidence and environment 
strengths or weaknesses. Mattingly and Berman (2006) also find an intriguing result with the 
environment variable. They suggest that their result might be due to the fact that firms that do 
good for the environment are also those that cause harm or extract from it. That is, it may be that 
environmental issues have such a large impact that even overconfident managers are driven to 
undertake environment hedging behaviour. This issue needs to be explored further and is beyond 
the scope of the current paper.  
A possible reason for the negative relationship between CEO confidence and the 
employment component of CSR (both overall and with the strength component of CSR) may be  
the insurance aspects of maintaining a workforce that is less prone to industrial relation disputes; 
more confident CEOs may underestimate the risks associated with industrial disputes. The 
diversity component that is categorised as having institutional impact includes a range of issues 
that are also related to employment. For example, employee benefits or other programs 
addressing work/life concerns are categorised as diversity strength. This component may also 
help reduce industrial relation disputes. Therefore, although the employment component of CSR 
is classified as a technical area, it has considerable risk-reducing advantages for the firm. The 
more confident the CEO, the less interest they have in reducing risks associated with industrial 
disputes and employment relations. 
In relation to the product component of CSR, we find that CEO confidence is not related 
to the strengths of the product component of CSR, but rather, is related to concerns associated 
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with the firm’s product. Specifically, there is a negative relationship between CEO confidence 
and product concerns. In other words, the more confident the CEO, the fewer concerns there are 
regarding the firm’s products. This detracts somewhat from Hirshleifer et al. (2012); however, as 
our model also controls for R&D expenditures, it is somewhat unclear what the exact driver is 
for this result. More research needs to be undertaken in this area to understand the reasons for 
this relationship. 
 5 Robustness tests  
5.1 Alternative proxy for overconfidence 
The relationship between the level of CEO confidence and CSR is examined by using different 
proxies for overconfidence. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b) 
offer a dummy variable to gauge CEO overconfidence by constructing the moneyness of a 
CEO’s year-end option holding. This is achieved as follows:   
Average realizable value=
CEO by the held options of No.
holdings option CEO  theof Value
 
Average strike price = Year end stock price-Average realizable value. 
1
price strike Average
pricestock  endYear 
Moneyness 



  
If Moneyness>0.67, and the CEO fails to exercise the options for two periods, the CEO is 
classified as overconfident and given the value of unity and zero otherwise (CONFIDENCE67).
8
 
We re-estimate our regressions using this alternative proxy for CEO confidence. In addition to 
                                                          
8 This contrasts to our continuous measure which follows Banerjee et al. (2015a and 2015b):
pricestock  endYear 
held options of No.
holding option of Value
Confidence 
. A difference between Banerjee et al. (2015a and 
2015b) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) is that in Hirshleifer et al. (2012) the denominator is less the average realizable value.  
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this measure, there are numerous other proxies of CEO confidence (Hill et al. 2014).  To add 
further robustness to our results, we consider previous stock performance as another proxy of 
CEO confidence. Recent stock performance has been shown to be associated with CEO hubris, 
which is related to confidence (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). We define previous stock 
performance (PP) as the stock return of the firm including dividends over the previous 12 
months. Relative CEO compensation (RC) has also been shown to proxy aspects of confidence 
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). We define RC as the salary and bonus of the CEO divided by 
the salary and bonus of the next highest executive, as per Hayward and Hambrick (1997). These 
results are shown in Table 8 as Model 1.1a, 1.1b and 1.1c respectively. 
[Table 8 here] 
As shown in Table 8, the results are relatively similar to those previously reported. There 
is a significant negative relationship between CSR overall for CONFIDENCE67 and previous 
stock performance (PP). Although relative CEO compensation (RC) enters the model with a 
negative coefficient, it is not significant. This tends to support the results of Hill et al. (2014) that 
the proxy measures of confidence may measure different aspects of CEO confidence. The results 
for the other control variables are consistent with those previously reported. 
Banerjee et al. (2015a) adjust their measure of confidence by taking the natural logarithm 
of one plus the level of confidence in order to account for potential non-linearity in the 
confidence/promotion relation. Owing to potential non-linearity in the confidence/CSR relation, 
we also adjust the CONFIDENCE variable by taking one plus the level of confidence. Our 
results remain robust to this adjustment. Generally, CEO confidence negatively relates to the 
level of CSR score, which is most evident for institutional characteristics of CSR.
9
  
                                                          
9 These results are available on request. 
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5.2 Alternative proxy for CSR 
KLD occasionally adds or deletes rating items, which causes concern that the variations in scores 
for CSR and subsections of CSR are caused by this addition and deletion, rather than by the 
variations in CEO confidence. Therefore, we follow Baron et al. (2011) to alleviate this concern 
in a four-step process:  First, we subtract the total number of concerns from total number of 
strengths for each subsection of CSR in a given year.  Second, we scale the score for each section 
of CSR by the total number of rated strengths and concerns in a given year  to construct a scaled 
subsection score.  Third, we total the scaled score for each subsection, and divide this sum by the 
number of rated subsections in a given year to obtain a scaled CSR overall score.  Finally, we re-
run all models and obtain similar results.
10
 That is, CSR negatively relates to CEO confidence, 
which is dominant for institutional aspects of CSR, thus supporting both the hedging aspect of 
CSR and reduced hedging for more confident CEOs. 
 
5.3 Endogeneity and omitted variables 
Most finance research poses problems associated with endogeneity. Endogeneity occurs when 
the independent variable of interest is correlated with the error term.  Sources of endogeneity 
include omitted variables, measurement errors, and simultaneity, and cause bias in regression 
models.  Although, in our models, we have included many variables as controls (to minimise 
omitted variable problems), and measure variables differently (to minimise the impact of 
measurement errors), these problems, along with other sources of endogeneity, remain. However, 
                                                          
10 These results are available on request. 
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to add further robustness to our initial results and to further reduce the impact of endogeneity, we 
re-do our analysis using propensity score matching, which was originally proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
11
  The propensity score matching approach we use is explained 
below. 
Certain firms may treat overconfidence as a criterion when selecting a CEO. Thus, the 
firm characteristics may simultaneously impact upon the choice of a CEO and the decision to 
engage in CSR. We first estimate the probability that a firm will hire an overconfident CEO by 
running a probit regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
CEO is overconfident and zero otherwise. This is a model that predicts the probability that a firm 
will hire an overconfident CEO, and follows Banerjee et al. (2015a). The model is as follows:  
                                                                                   
                                                                                                                               ( ) 
Where OCi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm hires an overconfident CEO in year t 
and zero otherwise, and where BV/MVi,t-1 is the book-to-market value of equity of firm i at the 
beginning of year t-1.  The other variables are as previously defined. 
The result from estimating Model 5 is the probability that a firm will hire an 
overconfident CEO. This is the propensity score. We then match two firms with the same 
propensity score, where one hires an overconfident CEO, and the other does not. Finally, we 
compare the level of CSR between the two matched firms. Using the CONFIDENCE67 variable, 
we obtain a coefficient of -0.306 at 1% significance.
12
 This further supports our result of a 
                                                          
11 For an introduction to propensity score matching see Austin (2011). 
12 Propensity score matching requires the variable of interest, in this case overconfidence, to be an integer. This is why we use 
CONFIDENCE67. 
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negative relationship between overconfidence and CSR, and also helps alleviate issues associated 
with endogeneity. 
Other possible reasons for explaining the relationship between CSR and CEO confidence include 
the possibility that highly acquisitive firms hire overconfident managers, and that these types of 
firms are less likely to spend resources on CSR.
13
 To test this possible reason we created three 
variables to tease out highly acquisitive firms. First, we created an index that ranked firms 
depending upon the number of acquisitions it had during the sample period. Second, we created a 
variable based on the number of acquisitions the firm completed over the previous 5 years. 
Finally, we created a dummy variable if the firm made an acquisition announcement in the 
previous year and zero otherwise. None of these approaches changed the negative and significant 
relationship between CSR and CEO confidence.  We also explored the potential for higher CSR 
firms to incur higher SG&A expenses. The results were robust to these additional tests.
 14
 
 
5.4 Momentum effects 
CEOs may choose to postpone their option exercise because they believe that the stock price will 
continue upwards from a previous upward trend. To control for this momentum effect, we 
augment into our models a variable representing the past five-year buy and hold stock returns as 
per Malmendier and Tate (2008). The results remain relatively robust to this additional control. 
CONFIDENCE is negatively related to CSR but insignificant; INST (Institutional component of 
                                                          
13 We thank a referee for these suggestions. 
14 These results are available on request. 
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CSR) is negative and significant, while TECH (Technical component of CSR) is positive and 
insignificant.
15
 
 
5.5 Financial constraints 
Given that overconfident CEOs are more likely to overinvest (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a), 
firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to face financial constraints. However, firms with 
financial constraints are less likely to invest in CSR. In other words, financial constraints are 
negatively related to CSR. To consider the impact of financial constraints on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and CSR, we include a proxy for financial constraints.  
The WW index of Whited and Wu (2006) is used to estimate financial constraints as follows: 
            (
     
       
)       (         )       (
      
       
)       (       )       (        )
      (     )                                                                                                                                                ( ) 
where CFi,t/TAi,t-1 is firm i cash flow at time t over book value of firm i total assets at t-1; 
DIVDUMi,t equals 1 if firm i pays cash dividends at time t and zero otherwise; LTDi,t/TAi,t-1 is 
firm i long-term debt at time t over book value of firm i total assets at t-1; LNATi,t is as 
previously defined; INDSGi,t is firm i three-digit industry sales growth at time t; and SGi,t is the 
firm i sales growth at time t. A firm with a higher WW index is perceived to be more financially 
constrained. When we include the control for financial constraint in Model 1.1, the results for the 
                                                          
15 These results are available on request. We also used 2-year and 3-year buy and hold returns with similar results. 
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CONFIDENCE variable remain consistent (negative for CSR, negative for the institutional 
component of CSR, and insignificant for the technical components).
16
 
 
5.6 Interactions 
Studies have documented links between CEO overconfidence and CEO characteristics. For 
example, Huang and Kisgen (2013) have reported that male CEOs exhibit relative 
overconfidence in significant corporate decision making compared to females, and Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) control for CEO age and CEO tenure.  The results reported in Table 2 regarding 
CEO characteristics suggest that there is possible interaction between gender, CSR, and 
confidence. To control for this, we re-estimated our models excluding female CEOs.  The results 
are similar to those reported, and are available on request. 
 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
Extensive research examines different dimensions of CEO confidence as well as the impacts of 
CEO confidence on various corporate policies. In this study, we examine the relationship 
between CEO confidence and firm CSR. Research shows that CSR has a hedging feature. CEOs 
who are overconfident underestimate firm risks, which leads overconfident CEOs to undertake 
less hedging. This predicts a negative relationship between CEO confidence and CSR. There is 
also evidence that overconfident managers have narcissistic tendencies. This predicts a positive 
relationship between overconfidence and CSR. We find that CEO confidence is negatively 
related to the level of CSR. This effect is stronger in the institutional aspects of CSR (particularly 
                                                          
16 These results are available on request. 
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community and workforce diversity), which has a greater hedging effect, than in the technical 
aspects of CSR (corporate governance and employee relation), which has less of a hedging 
effect. Although we also find a negative relationship with confidence and employee relations, 
this is also explained through the hedging hypothesis.  Our research finds a positive relationship 
between CEO confidence and product quality aspect of CSR. This may be explained by the 
existing research that overconfident CEOs are found to be better innovators, although further 
work needs to be done in this area. Furthermore, there is no evidence supporting a positive 
relationship between CEO confidence and CSR, suggesting that narcissism characteristics are not 
influencing CSR. Our results are relatively robust to different competing explanations and 
alternative proxies for CSR and CEO confidence and a range of controls. The findings offer 
important implications from an agency problem perspective. As overconfident CEOs 
overestimate the probability of success and underestimate risk, they are involved in less CSR, 
which ironically could mitigate the negative effects of damaging events on firm value.  
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Table 1 Variable Definitions 
This table summarizes the primary variables used in the analysis. 
 
Variable   Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
CSRi,t 
The total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns from all the 
aspects of CSR in a given year t for firm i; 
COMi,t 
The total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns within the 
community aspects of CSR in a given year t for firm i; 
CGOVi,t 
The total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns within the 
corporate governance aspects of CSR in a given year t for firm i; 
DIVi,t 
The total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns within the 
workforce diversity aspects of CSR in a given year t for firm i; 
EMPi,t 
The total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns within the 
employee relation aspects of CSR in a given year t for firm i; 
ENVi,t 
The total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns within the 
environment aspects of CSR in a given year t for firm i; 
HUMi,t 
The total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns within the 
human rights aspects of CSR in a given year t for firm i; 
PROi,t 
The total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns within the 
product quality aspects of CSR in a given year t for firm i; 
Independent Variables 
CONFIDENCEi,t 
A continuous variable to measure CEO confidence calculated as per Banerjee et 
al. (2015a and 2015) for firm i in year t; 
CONFIDENCE67i,t 
A dichotomous variable to measure CEO over confidence calculated as per 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012) for firm i in year t; 
Control Variables 
GENDERi A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO of firm i is male and zero otherwise. 
AGEi The age of a CEO of firm i in years. 
TENUREi The number of years the CEO of firm i has been in office. 
ROAi,t 
The ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to book value of total assets at 
the beginning of a given year t for firm i; 
LNATi,t 
Natural log of the book value of total assets at the beginning of a given year t for 
firm i; 
DEBTi,t 
The ratio of debt to book value of total assets at the beginning of a given year t 
for firm i; 
ADEXPi,t 
Total advertising expense divided by total book value of assets at the beginning 
of a given year t for firm i; 
RDEXPi,t 
Total R&D expenditure divided by total book value of assets at the beginning of 
a given year t for firm i; 
CAPITALEXPi,t 
Total capital expenditure divided by total book value of assets at the beginning 
of a given year t for firm i; 
EINDEXi,t Firm i’s EINDEX at the beginning of a given year t; 
BLOCKHOLDINGSi,t 
Firm i’s ownership position of block holders whose ownership is greater than 5 
percent at the beginning of a given year t. 
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Table 2 Firm Characteristics and CEO Characteristics Summary Statistics  
This table shows the summary statistics for sample CEOs and firms. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. m is million, b is billion. 
Panel A: CEO Characteristics 
 N 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
CONFIDENCEi 15,379  0.289 0.239 0.000 0.250 0.889 
Male 15,047  0.290     
Female 332  0.228***     
CSRi 15,379  -0.072 2.679 -6.000 0.000 9.000 
Male 15,047  -0.106     
Female 332  1.801***     
TENUREi  14,911  7.754 7.028 0.033 5.671 53.033 
Male 14,581  7.812     
Female 330  5.205***     
AGEi 14,835  55.984 6.749 33.000 56.000 90.000 
Male 14,510  56.060     
Female 325  52.569***     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics (n=15,379) 
   Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Total assetsi ($US)  20.400b 3.000b 1.023m 3.00b 2,360.000b 
ROAi  0.134 0.084 -0.085 0.129 0.395 
LNATi  8.080 1.614 4.958 7.928 12.543 
DEBTi  0.179 0.148 0.000 0.161 0.623 
ADEXPi  0.011 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.145 
RDEXPi  0.025 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.209 
CAPITALEXPi  0.048 0.046 0.000 0.035 0.242 
EINDEXi  2.140 1.369 0.000 2.000 6.000 
BLOCKHOLDINGSi  0.168 0.128 0.000 0.150 0.540 
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Table 3 Pearson Correlation Matrix Among Variables 
This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix and variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the main variables used in this study. 
  CSR CONFIDENCE GENDER AGE TENURE ROA LNAT DEBT ADEXP RDEXP CAPITALEXP EINDEX BLOCKHOLDINGS 
CONFIDENCE -0.021 
 
   
        
GENDER -0.099 0.039            
AGE -0.025 0.019 0.077           
TENURE -0.034 0.115 0.060 0.414          
ROA 0.063 0.246 -0.007 -0.009 -0.001         
LNAT 0.156 -0.051 0.039 0.097 -0.090 -0.211   
     
DEBT -0.077 -0.084 0.015 0.032 -0.041 -0.053 0.172 
      
ADEXP  0.126 0.020 -0.041 -0.047 -0.035 0.162 -0.011 -0.019   
   
RDEXP 0.104 0.028 -0.003 -0.113 0.029 0.022 -0.251 -0.221 0.004   
  
CAPITALEXP -0.042 0.074 0.000 -0.001 0.015 0.384 -0.113 0.117 0.011 -0.053 
   
EINDEX -0.024 -0.136 -0.005 0.006 -0.025 -0.060 -0.058 0.019 -0.057 -0.050 -0.016   
BLOCKHOLDINGS -0.136 -0.102 -0.072 -0.073 0.019 -0.066 -0.347 0.032 -0.009 -0.066 -0.038 0.114 
 
VIF 1.11 1.12 1.03 1.26 1..26 1.36 1.40 1.11 1.05 1.15 1.22 1.04 1.21 
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Table 4 Relation Between CSR and CEO Overconfidence 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is regressed on standard control variables without any controls for year and firm fixed effects. CEO 
Confidence (CONFIDENCE) is introduced and then fixed effects. The economic importance of the variables is also shown. Standard 
errors clustered on firm are given in parentheses, except in the column 3. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. The sample contains 14,385 observations. 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Model 1-OLS 
Excluding 
CONFIDENCE 
No fixed effects  
Model 1.1-OLS 
Including 
CONFIDENCE 
No fixed effects 
Model 1  
Excluding 
CONFIDENCE 
Fixed effects 
Clustered 
standard errors 
Model 1.1 
Importance 
Independent Variable 
CONFIDENCEi,t-1       -   -0.565*** -0.413*** 1.361 
  
  (0.094) (0.151)  
Control Variables 
GENDERi,t-1 - -1.934*** -1.907*** -0.239 -0.233  
  (0.145) (0.145) (0.363) (0.364)  
AGEi,t-1 ? -0.008** -0.008** -0.015* -0.014* 1.346 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)  
TENUREi,t-1 ? -0.000 0.001 0.014* 0.015* 1.429 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)  
ROAi,t-1 + 2.970*** 3.354*** 1.160** 1.429*** 1.668 
  
(0.285) (0.292) (0.529) (0.530)  
LNATi,t-1 + 0.337*** 0.334*** -0.173 -0.199* 4.424  
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.114) (0.113)  
DEBTi,t-1 - -1.101*** -1.146*** 0.762** 0.702** 1.432 
  
(0.152) (0.152) (0.325) (0.324)  
ADEXPi,t-1 + 11.26*** 11.160*** -0.437 -0.451  
  
(0.885) (0.884) (2.749) (2.725)  
RDEXPi,t-1 + 8.639*** 8.624*** -2.365 -2.462  
  (0.508) (0.507) (2.106) (2.091)  
CAPITALEXPi,t-1 + -2.886*** -2.933*** -0.606 -0.663  
  
(0.506) (0.505) (0.955) (0.953)  
EINDEXi,t-1 - 0.041*** 0.029* -0.117*** -0.116*** 2.193 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.044) (0.044)  
BLOCKHOLDINGSi,t-1 ? -1.697*** -1.792*** -1.448*** -1.500*** 2.807 
  
(0.183) (0.184) (0.287) (0.288)  
Year fixed effects 
 
NO NO YES YES  
Firm fixed effects 
 
NO NO YES YES  
Intercept 
 
-0.655** -0.474*    
  
(0.278) (0.279)    
Observations 
 
14,385 14,385 14,385 14,385  
Adjusted R
2
    0.096 0.098 0.119 0.121  
F-statistic  138.14*** 129.92 26.70*** 26.04***  
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Table 5 Impact of confidence on Institutional and Technical components of CSR 
Individual components of CSR (Institutional and Technical) are regressed on CEO Confidence along with control 
variables. An alternative specification with the institutional component of CSR included as an interaction term is also 
included. Standard errors clustered on firm are given in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The sample contains 14,385 observations. 
Independent Variables INSTi,t TECHi,t CSRi,t 
CONFIDENCEi,t-1 -0.366*** -0.053 -0.006 
 (0.099) (0.089) (0.129) 
Control Variables    
CONFIDENCEi,t-1 x INSTHIi,t-1 - - -1.416*** 
 - - (0.283) 
INSTHIi,t-1 - - 3.327*** 
 - - (0.120) 
GENDERi,t-1 -0.507** 0.271 0.044 
 (0.223) (0.184) (0.295) 
AGEi,t-1 -0.009* -0.003 -0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
TENUREi,t-1 0.011** 0.002 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
ROAi,t-1 0.187 1.292*** 1.124** 
 (0.378) (0.313) 0.447 
LNATi,t-1 -0.090 -0.121** -0.277*** 
 (0.084) (0.054) (0.088) 
DEBTi,t-1 0.778*** -0.053 0.415 
 (0.217) (0.193) (0.278) 
ADEXPi,t-1 0.968 -1.366 -1.079 
 (1.707) (1.700) (2.665) 
RDEXPi,t-1 -0.209 -2.390** -3.050* 
 (1.473) (1.078) (1.555) 
CAPITALEXPi,t-1 -0.812 -0.076 -0.590 
 (0.704) (0.547) (0.779) 
EINDEXi,t-1 -0.075** -0.048* -0.088** 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.038) 
BLOCKHOLDINGSi,t-1 -0.928*** -0.621*** -0.869*** 
 (0.201) (0.178) (0.250) 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 14,385 14,385  14,385 
Adjusted R
2
  0.135  0.206 0.319 
F-statistic 13.22*** 44.48*** 63.40*** 
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Table 6 Relation Between Subsections of CSR and CEO Overconfidence 
This table presents the regression results for each individual component of CSR. Controls for year and firm fixed 
effects are included. Standard errors clustered on firm are given in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate coefficients 
are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variables 
 Institutional components of CSR Technical components of CSR 
Variable COMi,t DIVi,t HUMi,t ENVi,t CGOVi,t EMPi,t PROi,t 
Independent Variable 
CONFIDENCEi,t-1 -0.144*** -0.176*** 0.003 -0.041 -0.007 -0.152*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.033) (0.058) (0.015) (0.049) (0.041) (0.056) (0.040) 
Control Variables 
GENDERi,t-1 0.0317 -0.457*** -0.027 0.006 -0.018 0.400*** -0.100 
 (0.044) (0.125) (0.034) (0.118) (0.112) (0.108) (0.067) 
AGEi,t-1 0.000 -0.006* -0.001* -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TENUREi,t-1 -0.000 0.007** 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROAi,t-1 -0.013 0.361 -0.082 -0.099 -0.016 1.072*** 0.184 
 
(0.141) (0.234) (0.053) (0.179) (0.146) (0.213) (0.125) 
LNATi,t-1 0.025 0.114** -0.031*** -0.198*** -0.120*** 0.034 -0.040 
 
(0.025) (0.046) (0.011) (0.042) (0.025) (0.039) (0.024) 
DEBTi,t-1 0.106 0.250* 0.049* 0.371*** 0.081 -0.184 0.078 
 
(0.073) (0.133) (0.027) (0.108) (0.086) (0.124) (0.082) 
ADEXPi,t-1 0.904 0.191 0.164 -0.642 -0.643 0.884 -1.538* 
 
(0.725) (0.988) (0.346) (0.844) (0.598) (1.041) (0.798) 
RDEXPi,t-1 0.070 1.320 -0.160 -1.271** -0.478 -0.910 -0.844** 
 
(0.513) (0.920) (0.140) (0.642) (0.530) (0.716) (0.407) 
CAPITALEXPi,t-1 -0.051 -0.457 -0.010 -0.294 -0.615** 0.375 0.158 
 
(0.232) (0.389) (0.086) (0.353) (0.277) (0.374) (0.236) 
EINDEXi,t-1 -0.010 -0.019 -0.002 -0.033** -0.050*** 0.003 0.005 
 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.004) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
BLOCKHOLDINGSi,t-1 -0.091 -0.460*** -0.112*** -0.249** -0.341*** -0.207* -0.002 
 
(0.071) (0.128) (0.033) (0.098) (0.087) (0.118) (0.079) 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,385 14,385 14,385 14,385 14,385 14,385 14,385 
Adjusted R2  0.045 0.163 0.047 0.207 0.117 0.120 0.077 
F-statistic 6.62*** 23.89*** 6.44*** 16.15*** 43.43*** 19.49*** 9.20*** 
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Table 7 CEO Overconfidence and Strengths and Concerns of CSR 
Qualitative Areas 
 
This table presents the regression results where strengths and weaknesses of the individual 
components of CSR are considered. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
CSR Qualitative Issues Areas CONFIDENCEi,t-1  
(Std.Err) 
Institutional components 
COMi,t      - Strengths -0.121***  
(0.031) 
      - Concerns 0.030  
(0.019) 
DIVi,t      - Strengths -0.207***  
(0.052) 
      - Concerns -0.025  
(0.028) 
HUMi,t      - Strengths -0.023** 
 (0.009) 
      - Concerns 0.004  
(0.019) 
ENVi,t      - Strengths -0.058  
(0.044) 
      - Concerns -0.013  
(0.029) 
Technical components 
CGOVi,t      - Strengths -0.050**  
(0.22) 
      - Concerns -0.048  
(0.034) 
EMPi,t      - Strengths -0.152***  
(0.047) 
      - Concerns 0.028  
(0.041) 
PROi,t      - Strengths -0.019  
(0.020) 
      - Concerns -0.145***  
(0.034) 
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Table 8 Relation Between CSR and Alternative measurement of CEO Overconfidence 
This table presents the regression results for different proxies of CEO confidence. Standard errors clustered on 
firm are given in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Independent Variables Model 1.1a Model 1.1b Model 1.1c 
CONFIDENCE67i,t-1 -0.350***   
 (0.110)   
PPi,t-1  -0.065*  
  (0.039)  
RCi,t-1   -0.056 
   (0.046) 
Control Variables    
GENDERi,t-1 -0.182 -0.238 -0.239 
 (0.373) (0.363) (0.363) 
AGEi,t-1 -0.013* -0.015* -0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
TENUREi,t-1 0.019** 0.014* 0.0149* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
ROAi,t-1 1.300** 1.178** 1.186** 
 (0.527) (0.529) (0.530) 
LNATi,t-1 -0.175 -0.175 -0.176 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) 
DEBTi,t-1 0.695** 0.735** 0.755** 
 (0.323) (0.324) (0.324) 
ADEXPi,t-1 -0.407 -0.457 -0.409 
 (2.694) (2.747) (2.732) 
RDEXPi,t-1 -2.390 -2.545 -2.398 
 (2.078) (2.122) (2.104) 
CAPITALEXPi,t-1 -0.613 -0.752 -0.633 
 (0.942) (0.958) (0.957) 
EINDEXi,t-1 -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
BLOCKHOLDINGSi,t-1 -1.480*** -1.451*** -1.433*** 
 (0.297) (0.295) (0.295) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,385 14,375 14,385 
Adjusted R2  0.122 0.120 0.119 
F-statistic 26.00*** 25.75*** 26.07*** 
 
